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REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
ASYLUM  
Naoko Hashimoto* 
ABSTRACT 
Despite the importance of refugee resettlement being frequently emphasised, there is only 
a limited amount of empirical research on why an increasing number and variety of States 
admit refugees through resettlement, when it is not an obligation under international law.  
This paper first sets out the four traditional perspectives on States’ motives for 
resettlement, based on well-established theories of International Relations, namely 
egoistic self-interest, altruistic humanitarianism, reciprocity, and international reputation.  
After examining the applicability of each of the traditional perspectives in light of past 
and recent resettlement practice in a deductive manner, the paper puts forward a different 
hypothesis: that States perceive resettlement as an alternative to asylum in terms of 
migration management, given the recent empirical and discursive trend.  While the paper 
by no means suggests that such a perception is a justifiable explanation for States’ motives 
for resettlement, the perception seems to add a different and relevant hypothesis when 
tracing the logic behind States’ increasing interest in resettlement.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Whenever solutions to refugee situations are discussed, it is almost universally echoed 
that resettlement should be promoted and expanded.1  However, only a limited amount of 
contemporary, empirical research has been conducted to decipher why an increasing 
number and variety of States have started actively engaging in resettlement.  The number 
of resettlement countries in the world has more than doubled over the past ten years.2  Of 
the traditional three durable solutions, resettlement is not a legal obligation, while the 
other two solutions − voluntary repatriation and local integration − are premised upon 
well-established international legal norms.  It may be puzzling that some States, which 
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(last visited 29 Nov. 2016); and W. L. Swing, “Practical considerations for effective resettlement”, Forced 
Migration Review, Issue 54, 2017, 4-6. 
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are assumed by realists to be self-interest-maximising entities,3 proactively reach out to 
vulnerable foreigners who have yet to reach their jurisdiction.  It is true that the vast 
majority of resettlement cases are admitted by traditional immigration countries often 
with high Gross Domestic Products such as the United States (US), Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand.  However, some non-immigration countries, including Japan and the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea), as well as middle-income countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, and Romania have recently embarked upon resettlement.  What are the 
motives, logics, and incentives that encourage States to opt for accepting refugees 
through the resettlement route?  This is the central question that this paper will address.  
The question is not only theoretically critical in Refugee and Migration Studies, as the 
paper will test the applicability of traditional International Relations theories to the way 
resettlement is currently implemented around the world and will propose a different 
hypothesis. But it also has policy implications: the answer may inform negotiation 
strategies employed by those international and national actors trying to promote 
resettlement around the world.  
 The paper begins with a brief review of the nature of the three durable solutions − 
voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement −  within the current 
international refugee protection regime, which serves to highlight puzzles surrounding 
the machinery of resettlement.  It is followed by a categorisation of the traditional 
perspectives on the drivers and assumptions behind resettlement, and a deductive testing 
of the applicability of each of the perspectives to historical resettlement cases and the 
current global resettlement spectrum.  After demonstrating the limited ability of the four 
traditional views to explain the contemporary resettlement landscape, the paper 
subsequently proposes a different hypothesis to understand States’ motives for 
resettlement based upon an emerging trend in refugee protection practices, namely 
resettlement as a ‘rational’ alternative to asylum for sovereign States wishing to manage 
migration.  Having explained the rationale of the hypothesis, the paper concludes by 
proposing that this hypothesis should be added and tested as a potential explanatory logic 
when tracing the process in which an increasing number and variety of States decide to 
embark upon resettlement.  
 
2. NATURE OF THE THREE DURABLE SOLUTIONS 
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The three durable solutions to the displacement situations of refugees comprise voluntary 
repatriation, local integration, and third country resettlement.4  What are the basic natures 
of these respective solutions in the current international refugee regime?  
 First, voluntary repatriation of refugees to their country of origin, whenever the 
situation allows, is based upon well-established international legal norms.  Article 13 (2) 
of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enshrines that “[e]veryone 
has the right to leave any country, including his own, and return to his country”.  Likewise, 
Article 12 (4) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)5 
provides that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country”.  
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter the Refugee 
Convention)6 itself also contains a so-called cessation clause in Article 1C, which lists 
several possible scenarios where the refugee status may cease to apply.  Such possibilities 
include cases of return to his/her country of origin when “the circumstances in connection 
with which [s]he has been recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist”.  These provisions 
in the major and relevant international legal instruments demonstrate that voluntary 
repatriation is enshrined in a normative relation between refugees and States, in that 
refugees have the right to return to their country of origin, while States of origin have the 
legal obligation to (re)admit them.  Although the cessation clause is rarely invoked for 
various practical reasons, host States may lawfully cancel the refugee status once the risk 
of persecution in the countries of origin is eliminated, which would inevitably encourage 
refugees’ repatriation unless the refugee has already obtained permanent residency or 
citizenship by then.  
 Second, local integration is also underpinned by various international legal norms.  
The minute an asylum-seeker enters an area of jurisdiction or effective control of another 
State either by land, sea, or air, the State bears the legal obligation not to deport the 
individual, until and unless s/he is found not to be in need of or deserving of international 
protection.  The principle of non-refoulement as enshrined in Article 33 (1) of the Refugee 
Convention has even come to be recognised as customary international law. 7   The 
Refugee Convention also includes various rights and entitlements for those who are 
officially recognised as refugees in Articles 12 to 31 as well as Article 34.  Hathaway 
argues that some of those rights and entitlements should be granted to asylum-seekers 
even before official recognition as refugees.8  In addition, a number of provisions of major 
international human rights instruments such as the ICCPR, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, Cultural Rights (ICESCR)9, the Convention against Torture and Other 
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6 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS, 28 Jul. 1951 (entry into force: 22 Apr. 1954).  
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Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)10, and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)11 among 
others, provide for various rights of foreign nationals including refugees and non-
discrimination within the jurisdiction of States Parties.  Thus, local integration of refugees 
is an international norm not only for States Parties to the Refugee Convention but also for 
States that are Parties only to human rights instruments.   
 Naturally, why States observe international legal norms is an interesting question, 
but one that lies outside the scope of this paper.  Important research into the reasons why 
sovereign States comply with international law has been conducted elsewhere.12   
 Third, in contrast to the normative nature of voluntary repatriation and local 
integration, resettlement is merely a discretionary policy option.  No State has a legal 
obligation proactively to admit refugees via resettlement who are still outside their 
jurisdiction; nor can a refugee claim a ‘right’ to be resettled.  While the term “international 
co-operation” is mentioned in the preamble paragraph of the Refugee Convention, the 
principle of responsibility-sharing has remained aspirational rather than a duty of States, 
at least from a legal point of view.13  
 Notwithstanding the weak legal standing of resettlement in the current 
international refugee regime, an increasing number of countries have embarked upon 
resettlement.  The number of countries with official and regular resettlement programmes 
has roughly doubled over the past decade.  As of the end of 2015, 33 countries had some 
sort of regular resettlement programmes under which approximately 100,000 refugees 
find a new home every year.  Why do States voluntarily and proactively admit refugees 
through resettlement even when not required under international law?  We now look at 
the conventional wisdom on this question.  
 
3. TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON STATES’ MOTIVES FOR 
RESETTLEMENT 
Given that resettlement falls outside the realm of international law, we need to turn to a 
discipline other than law.  Although there is no established theory on States’ motives for 
resettlement in any discipline, International Relations (IR) appear to provide useful 
guidance, since resettlement is fundamentally an international policy of States influenced 
by and influencing other States’ policies.  By employing established IR theories 
concerning international cooperation and burden-sharing, four categories of States’ 
                                                          
10 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 
UNTS, 10 Dec. 1984 (entry into force: 26 Jun. 1987). 
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12 H. Koh, “Why do states obey international law?” Yale Law Journal, 106, 1997, 2615-2634. 
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motives for resettlement may be inferred: (a) egoistic self-interest; (b) humanitarian 
altruism; (c) reciprocity; and (d) international reputation.14 
 First, traditional realists who regard States as self-interest-maximising entities 
would argue that States resettle refugees in their pursuit of egoistic self-interest.15  Betts, 
for instance, demonstrated through four case studies that Northern States have contributed 
to the protection of refugees in the global South only when their interests are linked with 
other issue-areas such as immigration, security, and trade.16  This argument underlines 
the utilitarian value rather than humanitarian value of resettlement, in line with the 
“humanitarian – utilitarian divide” coined by Noll and van Selm as an analytical 
framework for resettlement decisions. 17   The utility of resettlement may lie in 
demographics, in that it can fill labour shortages in some industrialised countries, or in 
diplomatic objectives, by undermining the regimes in countries that produce refugees.  
The latter was particularly palpable in the Cold War era when those fleeing communist 
regimes were almost automatically accepted by so-called ‘Western States’ as prima facie 
refugees.  To borrow the concepts developed by March and Olsen, “the logic of 
consequences” rather than that of appropriateness would explain the States’ motives 
behind resettlement policies.18  States are more concerned with the beneficial outcomes 
that resettlement will eventually bring them − such as labour force, ideological victory, 
and security in the region of origin for trade promotion −  rather than the value of 
resettlement suis generis.   
 Second, at the extreme opposite of egoism lies humanitarian altruism.  Idealists 
who emphasise cosmopolitanism and benevolence would argue that it is out of altruistic 
humanitarianism that States proactively resettle refugees.  According to Carens, for 
instance, resettlement is a moral duty, particularly for rich democratic States.19  Similarly, 
Gibney puts forward that humanitarianism should underpin the responsibilities of liberal 
democratic States to participate in resettlement.20  From a more empirical standpoint, Noll 
and van Selm conclude that it is a myth that States use resettlement only for utilitarian 
purposes, based upon their examination of resettlement practices of the US, Canada and 
                                                          
14 The MPI Report issued in May 2017 (while this manuscript was being reviewed) puts forward a 
different set of reasons for States to undertake or expand resettlement: (a) value-based motivations; (b) 
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incentives or opportunities.  While the content of the reasons mentioned in the MPI Report more or less 
overlaps with my argument, the four categories proposed in this paper are based upon well-established IR 
theories. See footnote 2.     
15 See footnote 13. 
16  A. Betts, Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime, Ithaca NY, 
Cornell University Press, 2009. 
17 G. Noll & J. van Selm, “Rediscovering Resettlement”, Insight No.3, Washington DC, Migration Policy 
Institute, 2003. 
18 J. G. March & J. P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”, International 
Organization, 52(4), 943-969, 1998. 
19 J. Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, 213. 
20 M. Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 237-247. 
   
some European countries.21  They drew particular attention to the fact that the US has 
accepted refugees who appear to be extremely difficult to integrate.22  In the same vein, 
Bessa argues that resettlement in the post-Cold War era has regained its humanitarian 
nature rather than utility as a political instrument.23  In March and Olsen’s term, “the logic 
of appropriateness” rather than of consequences provides justification for States to engage 
in resettlement.24  According to this school of thought, States accept refugees via the 
resettlement route because it is an appropriate, ethical, and virtuous thing to do, regardless 
of eventual consequences or expected outcomes.    
 The third perspective, reciprocity, is usually maintained by institutionalists in IR 
theories.  According to this camp, States calculate that ‘if we help other countries 
currently facing a massive influx of refugees, they may help us in the future, when we 
face similar situations’.  It is premised upon give-and-take in the web of relations between 
States, and such inter-State relations are often formulated, maintained, and promoted 
through international institutions and regimes.  According to Krasner and Keohane, 
regimes are defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations”.25  It follows that, for reciprocal relations to function, there has to 
be convergence of mutual expectations among like-minded rational entities, that is, States.  
If interpreted in the context of resettlement, the argument would be that States resettle 
refugees because their expectations concerning the principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures with respect to resettlement converge.  On the basis of such 
convergence, States resettle refugees expecting that other States follow similar practices, 
which will eventually reduce their own burden.     
 Finally, the fourth category of States’ incentives for resettlement is international 
reputation.  Constructivists, such as Wendt, Katzenstein, Finnmore, and Checkel, would 
argue that States gradually internalise the idea of resettlement through interaction and 
socialisation with other entities, such as States and international or non-governmental 
organisations, and engage in resettlement with a view to living up to identities and 
cultures that are socially constructed.26  States resettle refugees to maintain and promote 
legitimacy, (self-)esteem, and their good name in the international community.  In other 
words, it is to safeguard international reputation, which is socially constructed through 
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global interactions.27  Related to this perspective is a possible regional spill-over effect.  
When States in a particular region embark upon resettlement, their neighbours also start 
to consider the resettlement option, to keep their international reputation at least on a par 
with their neighbours’.  It may be paraphrased as ‘peer pressure’ among States.28  A case 
in point may be the European Resettlement Network, which started in 2010 and has 
yielded noticeable increases in the participation of European countries in resettlement, as 
well as “Resettlement in Solidarity”, which has had a similar effect in Brazil, Chile, 
Argentina and Uruguay.29  South Korea is perhaps another interesting case in point in that 
it decided to launch a resettlement programme in 2013, five years after the same decision 
was made by Japan in 2008.    
 Clearly, these four categories are not mutually exclusive, and some of them may 
overlap to a certain extent.  For instance, reciprocity might be regarded as a sub-category 
of egoistic self-interest.  It may also be argued that humanitarian altruism and 
international reputation mutually reinforce each other.  Furthermore, some States may 
well engage in resettlement to pursue more than one of these objectives.  Nevertheless, 
each of the four perspectives has a slightly different focus and emphasis. These will 
become clearer if we apply them to actual resettlement practices in the world, as will be 
done in the following sections.  
 
4. HISTORICAL CASES 
To what extent do the four perspectives on States’ decisions to resettle provide 
satisfactory explanations for the practice in our case studies?  We begin with a brief 
review of two major historical cases, followed by an examination of the current 
resettlement landscape.   
 The most noteworthy examples of large-scale resettlement since the end of 
Second World War are the movements of approximately two million people during the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, and the resettlement and relocation of more than one million 
Indo-Chinese refugees after 1975.  In the first case, it is maintained that the major factors 
that facilitated such massive migration included: the legacy of the Second World War and 
the strong remorse felt for failing to prevent the Holocaust; demand for labour force in 
the North and South American continent and Australia, which absorbed the surplus 
population in Europe; and the emerging ideological rivalry between ‘the East and the 
West’.30  It appears, therefore, that the theories of egoistic self-interest and humanitarian 
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altruism provide an adequate explanation for the factors that enabled massive resettlement 
in the aftermath of the Second World War.    
 In the second case concerning the Indo-Chinese refugees, it is usually argued that 
the Orderly Departure Program (ODP) and the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) for 
the Indo-Chinese refugees were made possible by the following factors: the legacy of the 
Vietnam War and the sense of obligation to rescue the displaced populations arising from 
the war (particularly for the US); the heightened ideological rivalry between the East and 
the West under the Cold War; and the importance of maintaining regional security in the 
South China Sea, which played an important role for oil shipping sea lanes.31  It is also 
noteworthy that the US functioned as a hegemon within ‘the West’ and successfully 
persuaded other governments to share the burden exceptionally by participating in ODP 
and CPA.  Thus, it appears that the mixture of egoistic self-interest, humanitarian altruism, 
and international reputation (particularly for the US after the defeat of the Vietnam War) 
were the major driving forces behind the international solutions to the Indo-Chinese 
refugee crisis.   
 
5. CURRENT GLOBAL OVERVIEW 
As of the end of 2015, 33 governments had regular resettlement programmes with 
specified annual quotas or targets.  Among these 33 countries, the number of refugees 
actually resettled over the past few years ranged from zero32 to 74,654, the total admitted 
to the US in fiscal year 2009.33  The gap between zero and nearly 75,000 is significant.  
In terms of criteria set by governments for the selection of refugees for resettlement, the 
most humanitarian practice is emergency admission of extremely vulnerable cases (such 
as the terminally ill, handicapped or single-female-headed households) via dossier-based 
selection.  In contrast, the most restrictive selection criteria set by some countries are good 
educational backgrounds, good health conditions, practical skills and good “integration 
prospects”.34  As regards procedures, some emergency cases are admitted to a third 
country in a matter of a few of days, while other refugees have to go through a lengthy 
security and background check which can take as long as two years. 35   Also, each 
resettlement government formulates its own standard operating procedures with varying 
degrees of engagement with international organisations (such as UNHCR and the 
                                                          
Karatani, “How History Separated Refugee and Migrant Regimes: In Search of Their Institutional Origins”, 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 17(3), 517-541, 2005; K. Long, “When refugee stopped being 
migrants: Movement, labour and humanitarian protection”, Migration Studies, 1(1), 4-26, 2013.  
31 Suhrke, “Burden-sharing During Refugee Emergencies”; C. Robinson, “The Comprehensive Plan of 
Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989-1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck”, Journal of 
Refugee Studies, 17(3), 319-333, 2004; Betts, Protection by Persuasion.  
32  UNHCR, Global Resettlement Statistical Report 2014, Geneva, UNHCR, 2015, available at: 
www.unhcr.org/52693bd09.pdf (last visited 29 Jun. 2016).  
33  The U.S. Department of State, Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System, available at: 
https://foia.state.gov/_docs/PIA/WorldwideRefugeeAdmissionsProcessingSystem.pdf (last visited 29 Jun. 
2016). 
34 The concept of “integration prospects” is discussed below.  
35 R. Capps & M. Fix, Ten Facts about U.S. Refugee Resettlement, Fact Sheet, Washington DC, Migration 
Policy Institute, Oct. 2015. 
   
International Organization for Migration (IOM)) and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs).  This brief look at the numbers and profiles of refugees admitted, as well as 
resettlement procedures, already indicates a wide divergence in the quantity and quality 
of the current resettlement programmes in the world.   
 Figure 1 provides a comprehensive picture of the contemporary landscape of 
resettlement programmes implemented by 28 resettlement countries, as of 2014.  While 
the total number of resettlement countries as of 2015 was 33, detailed data for some new 
resettlement countries are not yet readily available.  The size of the circles represents the 
average number of refugees resettled via UNHCR submissions and admitted by 28 
resettlement countries between 2010 and 2014.  The statistics are based upon UNHCR’s 
Global Resettlement Statistical Report 2014.36  The x and y axes show the extent to which 
individual resettlement governments take into account vulnerability and “integration 
prospects” when selecting refugees to resettle.  The information on the selection criteria 
employed by each government was extracted from the UNHCR’s Resettlement Country 
Chapters and ECRE’s Know-Reset Country Profiles.37   
[Figure 1: The extent to which vulnerability and integration prospects are taken into 
account in resettlement selection] 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 UNHCR, Global Resettlement Statistical Report 2014.   
37 UNHCR, Resettlement Country Chapters, Geneva, UNHCR, various years, available at:  
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/resettlement/4a2ccf4c6/unhcr-resettlement-handbook-country-
chapters.html (last visited 18 Aug. 2016); and European Council on Refugees and Exile (ECRE), Know-
Reset Resettlement Country Profiles, Brussels, ECRE, various years, available at: http://www.know-
reset.eu/?c=00003 (last visited 20 Nov. 2015). 
   
Two countries in the extreme corner in the lower right box are Sweden and Finland, which 
accept emergency vulnerable cases on dossier-based selection, with no particular 
integration prospects considered.  Other countries towards the centre in the same box 
(Norway, New Zealand, Belgium, Chile, Spain, and Iceland) may consider vulnerable 
cases and have no or little regard to “integration prospects”.  The US (the largest circle) 
should be regarded as belonging to this group.  Those in the lower left box (Switzerland, 
South Korea, Portugal, and Hungary) set unclear criteria or are countries with no 
information available.  Those in the upper right box (Australia, Canada, the U.K., 
Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Ireland, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Czech 
Republic, and Luxembourg) have mixed criteria that take into account both integration 
prospects and vulnerability.  Those in the upper left box (Japan and Romania) accept only 
refugees with high integration prospects.  Clearly, the notion of “integration prospects” 
is controversial and its meaning varies not only from country to country but also over 
time within one country.38  It is also worth underlining that being vulnerable does not 
automatically mean that the person will have difficulties in integrating.  Deciphering what 
“integration prospects” actually means for respective resettlement countries (as well as 
resettling refugees) is beyond the scope of this paper; however, in general, countries 
assess it based on health conditions, vocational skills, educational backgrounds, language 
proficiency, cultural or religious backgrounds, and ties with receiving communities.   
 It is obvious that Figure 1 demonstrates significant variation in the practices of 
resettlement in terms of quality and quantity.  In terms of quality, 13 out of 28 resettlement 
countries employ ‘mixed selection criteria’ that consider both vulnerability and 
integration prospects.  At the same time, it is noteworthy that a few countries consider 
either vulnerability or integration prospects alone (i.e. Sweden and Finland in the former 
case, and Japan and Romania in the latter).  In terms of quantity, it is evident from Figure 
1 that the average admission numbers vary significantly between States.  The US has been 
by far the largest recipient of refugees via resettlement, while 14 countries accept fewer 
than 50 refugees per year.  It is true that Figure 1 only reflects the selection criteria that 
are made public and the numbers resettled via State-run programmes, without taking into 
account refugees resettled through private sponsorship schemes or humanitarian 
admissions, which have been expanding significantly in the past few years.39  However, 
for the purpose of the present analysis, suffice it to say that Figure 1 demonstrates 
qualitative and quantitative variety in contemporary resettlement practices around the 
world.  
 
6. LIMITED APPLICABILITY OF THE TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
                                                          
38 K. S. Kohl, “The Tough and the Brittle: Calculating and managing the risk of refugees”, in T. T. 
Bengtsson, M. Frederiksen, & J. E. Larsen (eds.), The Danish Welfare State: a sociological investigation, 
New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 201-216, 2015.  
39 J. Kumin, Welcoming Engagement: How Private Sponsorship Can Strengthen Refugee Resettlement in 
the European Union, EU Asylum: Towards 2020 Project, Brussels, MPI Europe, Dec. 2015.  
   
In light of this overall spectrum of contemporary global resettlement practices, how can 
we assess the applicability of the four traditional perspectives on States’ motives for 
resettlement? 
First, the notion of egoistic self-interest appears to exhibit a certain applicability 
in light of Figure 1.  The majority of resettlement countries officially employ mixed 
selection criteria, taking into account the integration prospects of refugees to varying 
degrees.  If States prefer young, healthy, educated refugees, their motives may stem from 
labour-shortage or demographic calculations.  If States make linguistic, religious, or 
cultural background a condition, it may be understood as a measure to reinforce or at 
least not to jeopardise social cohesion or ethnic, religious or cultural balance within 
receiving communities.  However, a limit of this theory is that there are still 22 countries 
that take vulnerability into consideration, even if it is to varying degrees.  Some States 
have resettled extremely vulnerable individuals, such as the terminally ill, disabled, and 
elderly, who are unlikely to bring about any tangible ‘benefits’ to the receiving society 
in any immediate or material sense, even when there does not seem to be any political, 
diplomatic, or ideological gain for the receiving State.  The ‘10 or more’ or ‘20 or more’ 
programmes run by some Nordic countries, under which extremely vulnerable refugees 
are resettled in a matter of few days, are a case in point.40  While this perspective of 
egoism is more widely applicable than some of the other perspectives, it still cannot 
provide a universal theory to describe all States’ motives for resettlement. 
Regarding the second perspective on States’ motives for resettlement, 
humanitarian altruism, only two countries (Sweden and Finland) do not take into account 
“integration prospects” in their selection criteria.  The remaining 22 countries (excluding 
the four countries whose selection criteria are unclear) attach a certain degree of 
importance to “integration prospects” in one way or another.  Clearly, one must be 
cautious about jumping to the conclusion that the countries that consider vulnerability 
alone are by definition more altruistic.  For instance, Sweden and Finland may be 
accepting extremely vulnerable refugees for the purpose of improving or maintaining 
their international reputation.  Yet, for States attaching more importance to the 
“integration prospects” of refugees, it would be difficult to argue that they resettle 
refugees based upon pure humanitarianism.  If resettlement States are to claim that their 
motives are purely humanitarian, the only selection criterion should be the needs and 
vulnerability of individual refugees, rather than their health condition, qualifications or 
ties with local communities.  Thus, the theory of humanitarian altruism may only apply 
to the two countries at the extreme corner of the lower right box (and potentially the four 
countries in the lower left box) but cannot apply to the remaining countries.   
 The third perspective, reciprocity, appears to be difficult to sustain because of the 
wide divergence of State practice in terms of both quantity and quality, as shown in Figure 
1.  To begin with, it is hard to imagine any concrete scenario in which many of the 
traditional resettlement countries such as Canada, New Zealand, and the Nordic countries 
                                                          
40 For more details of ’10 or more’ and ’20 or more’ programmes, see UNHCR, Resettlement Country 
Chapters, or ECRE, Know-Reset Resettlement Country Profiles. 
   
would be inundated with massive arrivals of spontaneous asylum-seekers.41  Countries 
geographically situated in areas far from refugee-producing countries must have a 
different incentive for resettlement than reciprocity.  In terms of quantitative convergence, 
the US has consistently borne the vast majority of resettlement burdens, and one might 
still refer to the US as a “hegemon” in the world of refugee resettlement,42 at least at the 
time of writing.  It is the “hegemonic stability model”43 rather than the ‘regime model’ 
that can better explain the contemporary global resettlement spectrum.  In terms of 
qualitative convergence, Figure 1 demonstrates that the 28 resettlement countries employ 
a variety of selection criteria, taking into account vulnerability and integration prospects 
to varying degrees.  Put differently, there is no ‘convergence’ of expectations among 
resettlement States in terms of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
regarding resettlement.  The annual quotas and selection criteria of each resettlement 
country are decided at the national level, rather than at any international fora.  
Resettlement States do meet together with UNHCR and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) at the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement in Geneva, but they 
merely facilitate information-sharing and do not serve as a decision-making forum.  While 
several calculation formulas have been proposed to distribute resettlement quotas in the 
world according to wealth, populations, unemployment rate, and other variables of 
affluent countries, such proposals have yet to take shape as an international norm.44  In 
short, the quantitative and qualitative natures of resettlement programmes implemented 
by the 28 countries are so divergent that the logic of reciprocity demonstrates only limited 
explanatory power in the realm of contemporary refugee resettlement.    
 Finally, the fourth perspective of international reputation may well be the most 
applicable among the four traditional perspectives.  States that share other countries’ 
burden of hosting refugees, and especially those that accept extremely vulnerable 
refugees, can certainly expect to improve their international reputation.  Particularly in 
the era of highly developed information technology and social media, public information 
regarding which countries implement resettlement and how many refugees they accept is 
readily available on the internet.  Such information would serve to improve the image and 
public opinions concerning those resettlement States.  In addition, there appears to be an 
emerging belief that richer countries should admit more refugees via resettlement.45 
Economically developed countries may well feel a certain ‘peer pressure’ to admit 
refugees via resettlement, in order not to jeopardise their international reputation.  At the 
same time, one may wonder how those countries that set restrictive selection criteria and 
                                                          
41 Reception of 162,450 asylum applications by Sweden in 2015 could be regarded as an extraordinary 
event due to the open-border policy following the so-called Syrian refugee “crisis”. 
42  Suhrke, “Burden-sharing During Refugee Emergencies”. 
43 R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981; Keohane, 
After Hegemony.  In light of the reduction of the resettlement quota as recently announced by the US 
president, it remains to be seen if the global resettlement spectrum may be moving from the hegemonic 
stability model to the balance of power model.   
44 It is true that some EU Member States agreed upon the EU Emergency Relocation Scheme, but its 
implementation has been slow.  
45 J. Meyer, The richest countries take the fewest refugees, Agenda, Geneva, the World Economic Forum, 
Jul. 2016. 
   
resettle tiny numbers of refugees (particularly Japan and Romania) could expect to 
improve their international reputation, when their resettlement motives appear to be based 
upon egoistic calculations.  The same applies to a lesser extent to those countries with 
mixed selection criteria (countries in the upper right box in Figure 1).  Despite its 
relatively wider applicability, the perspective of international reputation also fails to 
provide a universal account for all resettlement countries’ motives.  
 The correlation between selection criteria and States’ motives behind resettlement 
needs to be investigated more thoroughly through empirical case studies based upon in-
depth fieldwork in each of the 33 resettlement countries.  For our present purpose, 
however, suffice it to say that none of the four traditional perspectives seems to provide 
a common denominator universally applicable to the motives of all resettlement countries 
in the contemporary world.  This poses significant problems in terms of both theory and 
practice. If a good theory has to demonstrate universality and contemporary applicability, 
the conventional wisdom appears somewhat unsatisfactory or outdated.  In terms of 
practice, the lack of universally applicable theory hampers efforts of practitioners who 
hope to take advantage of theory-based predictability as a leverage to increase global 
resettlement quotas.  This situation thus calls for a different hypothesis.   
 
7. A DIFFERENT HYPOTHESIS: RESETTLEMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
TO ASYLUM? 
In recent years, a perspective that regards resettlement as an “alternative pathway to 
protection” has emerged.46  While this perspective was first officially articulated by the 
Government of Australia in 2012,47 several States had previously demonstrated their 
preference for the resettlement route over the spontaneous asylum route. 48   In the 
following sections, we will firstly compare statistical trends of asylum and resettlement 
since 2000; secondly, review recent policy measures which demonstrate States’ 
unequivocal preference for resettlement; and, thirdly, compare from the State perspective 
resettlement procedures with those of asylum, in order to identify a potential common 
denominator that can explain why an increasing number and variety of States resettle 
refugees.   
 
7.1. Statistical comparison of asylum and resettlement since 2000 
Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 show the numbers of substantive asylum decisions made by the 
governments of destination countries, those who officially received Convention refugee 
status after lodging asylum applications upon spontaneous arrival (the asylum route),49 
                                                          
46  A. Garnier, “Migration Management and Humanitarian Protection: The UNHCR’s ‘Resettlement 
Expansionism’ and Its Impact on Policy-making in the EU and Australia”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, 40(6), 942-959, 2014; Nakashiba, Postmillenial UNHCR refugee resettlement. 
47 Garnier, “Migration Management and Humanitarian Protection”, 951-954.  
48 Van Selm, “The Strategic Use of Resettlement”. 
49 It is true that a few cases upon resettlement might (be required to) apply for asylum to be officially 
granted a refugee status, and the UNHCR Statistics does not differentiate between the asylum claims 
lodged by spontaneously arriving asylum-seekers and those lodged by resettled individuals upon arrival.  
   
and refugees admitted through the resettlement route in 2000, 2005, 2010, 2014, and 2015, 
according to the UNHCR Population Statistics. 50   Only the number of refugees 
recognised by Austria in 2014 is based upon Eurostat, since the number shown in the 
UNHCR Population Statistics (zero) is apparently inaccurate.   While UNHCR data often 
differ from those issued by national authorities, this paper uses the UNHCR statistics for 
all the figures (except for Austria in 2014) to ensure compatibility and comparability. The 
tables list the top 10 countries accepting larger numbers of refugees via resettlement in a 
given year (omitting so-called humanitarian admissions, which are not included in 
UNHCR figures).   
 
Table 1     
Year 2000     
 Total decisions Recognised Refugees Resettlement  Recognition Rate 
the U.S.  111932 24000 72515 21.4% 
Canada 28808 13989 13518 48.6% 
Australia 18952 4607 7330 24.3% 
Sweden 22405 480 1501 2.1% 
Norway 15580 101 1481 0.6% 
Finland 2024 13 756 0.6% 
New Zealand 3524 295 699 8.4% 
Denmark 9075 1327 464 14.6% 
Netherlands 76822 1808 204 2.4% 
Japan 236 22 135 9.3% 
(average)    13.2% 
 
  
                                                          
However, it is understood from the actual procedures of the resettlement countries (see footnote 37) that 
the number of such asylum applications lodged by resettled refugees is minimal and that the vast majority 
of asylum claims are lodged by spontaneously arriving asylum-seekers.  
50 UNHCR, Population Statistics (online database), Geneva, UNHCR, available at:  
http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers (last visited 12 Jul. 2017).  The total asylum decisions include 
all claims substantively reviewed in the given year, including the first instance, appeal instance, and 
repeated / reopened applications, since the UNHCR Statistics shows a combined figure for some countries 
in some years without making any distinction between the first instance, appeal instance, and repeated / 
reopened cases.    
   
 
Table 2     
Year 2005     
 Total Decisions Recognised Refugees Resettlement  Recognition Rate 
the U.S.  172470 19766 53813 11.5% 
Australia 6801 1771 11654 26.0% 
Canada 27150 12040 10400 44.3% 
Sweden 53586 764 1263 1.4% 
Finland 2084 12 766 0.6% 
Norway 13489 629 749 4.7% 
New Zealand 1013 210 741 20.7% 
Denmark 2252 168 483 7.5% 
Netherlands 26067 967 419 3.7% 
the U.K. 71645 8665 175 12.1% 
(average)    13.3% 
 
 
 
 
Table 3     
Year 2010     
 Total Decisions Recognised Refugees Resettlement Recognition Rate 
the U.S.  69951 19034 71362 27.2% 
Canada 32456 12305 12098 37.9% 
Australia 9340 3859 8516 41.3% 
Sweden 44717 2304 1786 5.2% 
Norway 27102 3213 1097 11.9% 
the U.K.  47834 9330 715 19.5% 
New Zealand 524 125 631 23.9% 
Finland 5820 179 541 3.1% 
Denmark 3922 769 495 19.6% 
Germany 42942 7703 469 17.9% 
(average)    20.7% 
 
 
 
   
Table 4     
Year 2014     
 Total Decisions Recognised Refugees Resettlement Recognition Rate 
the U.S.  71859 21760 73011 30.3% 
Canada 21621 9943 12277 46.0% 
Australia 13399 2540 11570 19.0% 
Sweden 68532 10692 1971 15.6% 
Norway 17977 3826 1286 21.3% 
Finland 3706 501 1089 13.5% 
Netherlands 20256 2743 791 13.5% 
the U.K. 34690 10731 787 30.9% 
New Zealand 497 154 737 31.0% 
Austria 4070 2050 388 50.4% 
(average)    27.1% 
 
 
 
Table 5     
Year 2015     
 Total Decisions Recognised Refugees Resettlement Recognition Rate 
the U.S.  83031 23361 52583 28.1% 
Canada 16083 9171 10236 57.0% 
Australia 9114 3106 5211 34.1% 
Norway 17610 5610 2220 31.9% 
Germany 345318 138666 2097 40.2% 
Sweden 71157 12960 1808 18.2% 
the U.K. 50486 15325 1768 30.4% 
Finland 6950 1060 964 15.3% 
New Zealand 462 198 756 42.9% 
France 122684 21287 700 17.4% 
(average)    31.5% 
 
 
  
   
As one can see from Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, the US, Australia, and New Zealand have 
consistently accepted much larger numbers of refugees via resettlement than those they 
have recognised as Convention refugees among spontaneously arriving asylum-seekers.  
Canada has often accepted similar numbers of refugees via resettlement to those granted 
Convention status upon spontaneous arrival.  As these four countries are so-called 
“traditional immigration countries”, the scale of their resettlement admissions may well 
be explained as forming part of their overall immigration policies.  Meanwhile, it is 
noteworthy that several Nordic countries, such as Sweden, Finland, Norway, and 
Denmark have often accepted larger numbers of refugees through resettlement than those 
arriving through the asylum route.  It is true that simple comparison of the absolute 
numbers of refugees admitted through the asylum and resettlement routes does not 
generate any meaningful analysis.  States do not (or rather should not) have any control 
over the number or the content of asylum claims made by spontaneously arriving asylum-
seekers, and there is nothing wrong – at least in theory – in recognising only a few of 
them as refugees, if all other asylum-seekers do not meet the refugee definition prescribed 
in the Refugee Convention.  On the other hand, decisions on resettlement targets or 
ceilings fall into the realm of complete State discretion, according to national priorities.  
Comparison of refugee recognition rates with resettlement acceptance rates, however, 
reveals an interesting tendency.  The average refugee recognition rate of the top 10 
resettlement countries was only 27.1 per cent in 2014 and 31.5 per cent in 2015.  Some 
Nordic countries occasionally recognised an even smaller ratio of asylum-seekers as 
refugees; the refugee recognition rate was less than 1 per cent in Norway in 2000 and 
Finland in 2000 and 2005, as shown in the tables.  Meanwhile, the same countries have 
accepted the vast majority of refugees submitted by UNHCR for resettlement.  The global 
resettlement acceptance rate was 91.3 per cent in 2014 and 91.8 per cent in 2015.51  While 
there is no official data issued by UNHCR as regards the global resettlement acceptance 
rates for earlier years, several researchers point out that the rate has significantly increased 
over the past two decades.52  To be sure, those asylum-seekers who make their own way 
to faraway destination countries on the one hand and those refugees who are stranded in 
neighbouring developing countries on the other do represent very different populations.  
However, even when taking into account differences in individual persecution claims and 
profiles between spontaneous asylum-seekers and resettling refugees, the gap between 
31.5 per cent (the average refugee recognition rate in 2015 among the top 10 resettlement 
countries) and 91.8 per cent (the global average resettlement acceptance rate in 2015) is 
still significant.  This is particularly so given that countries of origin of spontaneously 
arriving asylum-seekers and nationalities of refugees to be resettled often overlap, such 
as Afghanistan, Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Myanmar, Somalia, 
                                                          
51  UNHCR, Resettlement Factsheets 2014, Geneva, UNHCR, 2015, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/55aca2614.html (last visited 1 Jul. 2016); and a statement made by a 
UNHCR representative at the Expert Meeting on Resettlement and Other Forms of Admission of Persons 
in Need of International Protection, EU Eastern Partnership Panel on Migration and Asylum, held 2-3 June 
2016 in Stockholm.  For more details, see: http://eapmigrationpanel.org/en/meetings/expert-meeting-
resettlement-and-other-forms-admission-persons-need-international-protection (last visited 30 Dec. 2016). 
52  J. Frederiksson & C. Mougne, Resettlement in the 1990s: A Review of Policy and Practice, 
EVAL/RES/14, Geneva, UNHCR, Dec. 1994, 5; and van Selm, “The Strategic Use of Resettlement”, 42.   
   
and Syria.53  Although more disaggregated comparison of refugee recognition rates and 
resettlement acceptance rates for each country of origin and destination would probably 
yield interesting findings, the figure of 91.8 per cent, for the purpose of present analysis, 
generally suggests that the States put overwhelming trust in the refugee status 
determination (RSD) pre-conducted by UNHCR prior to the case submissions for 
resettlement.  States’ endorsement of the results of UNHCR’s RSD is noteworthy, 
particularly given that UNHCR employs a wider refugee definition (known as ‘mandate 
refugee recognition’) than that contained in the Refugee Convention, and that States are 
well aware of this UNHCR practice.54  Although some refugees are still required to lodge 
an official asylum application upon arrival in their country of resettlement, such 
procedures are usually for formality only, and their refugee status (or at least some kind 
of long-term residential status) is de facto guaranteed.  In other words, the resettlement 
route allows both States and refugees to bypass the meticulous, adversarial, individual 
RSD procedures which are otherwise conducted by States Parties to the Refugee 
Convention vis-à-vis spontaneously arriving asylum-seekers.    
In short, the recent asylum and resettlement statistics demonstrate that some States 
accept a much larger number of refugees through resettlement than asylum and that the 
resettlement acceptance rate is significantly higher than the refugee recognition rate.  In 
other words, those States prefer accepting refugees through resettlement who are already 
screened in by UNHCR’s RSD process prior to their arrival, to adjudicating asylum 
applications by spontaneous arrivals.  This trend of placing preference on resettlement 
over asylum has taken shape in a more acute form for the past several years.  
 
7.2. Recent policy trends highlighting preference of resettlement 
On 25 July 2011, the Governments of Australia and Malaysia signed an ‘Arrangement on 
Transfer and Resettlement’. 55   Under this agreement, Australia would have sent to 
Malaysia 800 asylum-seekers who had arrived in Australia irregularly by boat; in return, 
Australia would have accepted 4,000 refugees for resettlement from Malaysia over the 
following four years.  On 31 August 2011, however, the Australian High Court ruled that 
this ‘refugee swap agreement’ between the two countries was unlawful, given the 
inadequate legal protection for asylum-seekers in Malaysia, which is not a signatory to 
the Refugee Convention.56  The refugee swap deal, therefore, did not materialise and no 
                                                          
53 See UNHCR’s annual reports ‘Global Trends’ in 2014 and 2015, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/statistics/country/556725e69/unhcr-global-trends-2014.html (last visited 12 Jul. 
2017) and http://www.unhcr.org/uk/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html (last 
visited 12 Jul. 2017). 
54 Van Selm, Ibid.; Nakashiba, Postmillenial UNHCR refugee resettlement; and UNHCR, Resettlement 
Handbook. 
55  The text of the Arrangement is available from the website of the Parliament of Australia at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2
011/July/Australia-Malaysia_asylum_seeker_transfer_agreement (last visited 30 Jun. 2016).  
56  J. Thompson, “High Court scuttles Malaysia swap deal”, ABC, 6 Sep. 2011, available at: 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-08-31/high-court-rules-on-asylum-seeker-challenge/2864218 (last 
visited 29 Jun. 2016).  
   
asylum-seeker in Australia or refugee in Malaysia was actually ‘swapped’.  Nevertheless, 
the deal signalled that asylum and resettlement might be traded off.   
 Some five years on, a similar arrangement was made on the European continent.  
On 18 March 2016, an ‘EU−Turkey Statement’57  was made public.  The statement 
included an important action point in which all irregular ‘migrants’ coming to Greece 
through Turkey as from 20 March 2016 who would not apply for asylum in Greece, or 
whose application was deemed unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the EU 
Asylum Procedures Directive, would be returned to Turkey.  For every Syrian returned 
to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian refugee would be resettled from Turkey 
to the EU, taking into account the vulnerability criteria set by UNHCR.  This arrangement 
has been called a ‘one-on-one’ deal.  In the final version of the EU-Turkey Statement, 
“the right to asylum” as provided in Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
just survived, at least on paper, but the extent to which the right is substantively  
guaranteed under the accelerated procedures in Greece is highly questionable.58  Thus, 
although the details are different, the thrust of this deal and the Australia−Malaysia swap 
arrangement is essentially the same, in that resettlement places were offered in exchange 
for asylum-seekers, presumably in the hope of deterring spontaneous arrivals.   
The preference for resettlement over asylum was unequivocally stated in the 
European Commission (EC)’s proposal for establishing a Union Resettlement Framework 
issued on 13 July 2016.59  It stated that; 
 
Resettlement should be the preferred avenue to international 
protection in the territory of the Member States and should not be 
duplicated by an asylum procedure.  Accordingly, applications for 
international protection of persons resettled via an ordinary 
procedure, for whom a full assessment of their qualification as a 
refugee and eligibility as a beneficiary of subsidiary protection has 
been conducted, would not be admissible’ (emphasis added).60 
 
This suggests that the EC prefers resettlement to asylum and that asylum adjudication 
should be conducted prior to the admission of refugees to the EU area.  At the same time, 
the proposal included a number of new policies particularly noteworthy for the purpose 
of this paper, such as; 
                                                          
57 European Union, EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, Press Release, 144/16, 18/03/2016, available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/ (last visited 29 
Dec. 2016).  
58 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2012/C 326/02), 12 Dec. 2007 (entry into force: 
1 Dec. 2009).  
59 EC, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Union 
Resettlement Framework and amending Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and the 
Council, Brussels, 13.7.2016, COM (2016) 468 final, 2016/0255 (COD), available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-468-EN-F1-1.PDF (last visited 2 Sep. 
2016).  
60 Ibid., 13.  
   
 It eliminates the possibility of resettlement for third country nationals or stateless 
persons who irregularly entered, irregularly stayed in, or attempted to irregularly enter 
into the EU during the previous five years prior to resettlement; this proposal runs the 
risk of violating Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, i.e. prohibition of imposing 
penalties on account of illegal entry of refugees;  
 Application for resettlement could be made by those who have a well-founded fear of 
persecution but are still within their own countries; this proposal paves the way for 
increasing in-country asylum applications;  
 In addition to the seven vulnerability categories for resettlement usually set by 
UNHCR, “persons with socio-economic vulnerability” are eligible for resettlement; 
and  
 It allows EU Member States to request UNHCR to fully assess whether those 
submitted by UNHCR qualify as refugees within the meaning of Article 1 of the 
Refugee Convention.  
 
Can these recent arrangements be explained by any of the four traditional 
perspectives?  First, in contradiction to the perspective of pursuing egoistic self-interest, 
the EU−Turkey Statement underlined that refugees to be resettled should meet UNHCR’s 
vulnerability criteria.  The EC’s proposals to institutionalise in-country application 
procedures and to widen the vulnerability criteria to encompass socio-economic factors 
(in addition to civil and political factors) can neither be explained by egoistic self-interest.  
Second, if Australia and the EU had altruistic humanitarian motives, they would have 
admitted refugees through resettlement without making it conditional on swapping with 
asylum-seekers.  Also, the EC’s proposal to bar applications for resettlement by those 
who had irregularly entered the EU within the previous five years runs contrary to pure 
humanitarianism. Third, the reciprocity argument would expect that a similar 
arrangement would be made by other resettlement countries.  While Australia and the EU 
appear to be following a similar path, it remains to be seen if such a swap deal becomes 
a universal ‘norm’ to be employed by other major resettlement countries, most notably 
the US and Canada.61  The EC proposal, if adopted, would better harmonise principles, 
norms, and rules as regards resettlement, at least among EU Member States, although the 
EC clearly states that “the Member States remain the ones deciding on how many people 
they will resettle each year”.62  It appears that the substantive decision-making procedures 
will remain at the national level, rather than at the regional or international level.  Finally, 
both Australia and the EU have been harshly criticised from various corners for making 
such human-trading deals, leaving little hope for them to improve their international 
                                                          
61 It would be interesting to observe if and how the ‘refugee swap deal’ reportedly discussed and agreed 
between the Australia and the US under the previous administration might be implemented, in which the 
US government would accept 1,250 asylum-seekers detained in Nauru and Manus Island on behalf of the 
Australian government while the Australian government would accept 50 El Salvadorian, Honduran and 
Guatemalan refugees hosted in Costa Rica on behalf of the US government.  
62 EC, Establishing an EU Resettlement Framework: Frequently asked questions, Fact Sheet, Brussels, 13 
Jul. 2016, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2437_en.htm (last visited 29 Nov. 
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reputation.  It remains to be seen if the new Union Resettlement Framework, once 
implemented, will help to ameliorate the image of the EU tarnished by its responses to 
the recent European ‘refugee crisis’.  In sum, none of the traditional perspectives seems 
to be able to offer an overarching explanation for these recent practices and proposals, 
while the emerging trend indicates that resettlement is increasingly used as an alternative 
to asylum.  
 
7.3. Procedural comparison between asylum and resettlement 
Why have some States started to use resettlement as an alternative to asylum?  It is not 
surprising if one compares current practices of the asylum route with the resettlement 
route purely from States’ perspectives: for States, resettlement serves the logic of 
migration management.  
 In the case of asylum-seekers, receiving States have no access to their identities 
prior to arrival; they may be genuine refugees, economic migrants, or ‘potential criminals’.  
It is not unusual that asylum-seekers cannot even confirm their officially registered name 
or date of birth or nationality upon arrival.  Meanwhile, States cannot expel or refouler 
any asylum-seekers once they are within their jurisdiction until and unless, following a 
thorough adjudication process, they are found not to be in need of or deserving of any 
form of international protection.  At the same time, arrivals of asylum-seekers are, by 
definition, spontaneous and often clandestine.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to predict 
if they come, when they come, and how they come.  States have no control (at least in 
theory) of how many asylum applications they may receive in any given year; it could be 
zero or a million as the recent case of Germany demonstrated.  As regards costs, it is often 
held that resettlement is an expensive enterprise. 63   It is difficult to generalise and 
compare costs, as each asylum case differs and resettlement countries have quite diverse 
programmes.  However, if one includes the personnel costs of immigration officials, 
lawyers, and judges involved in individual RSD procedures, some cases of repeated 
asylum claims or those appealed at regional courts such as the European Court of Human 
Rights may well be expensive.64  Furthermore, asylum incurs another ‘cost’, namely the 
political implication vis-à-vis the government of the countries of origin.  As is often said, 
nothing is more political than providing asylum to those refugees fearing persecution due 
to their political opinions.65  That is why nearly all asylum-seekers fleeing communist 
regimes during the Cold War were provided asylum almost automatically, thereby 
enabling the ‘Western States’ to undermine communism. 
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In the case of resettlement, in contrast, at least basic identities of resettlement 
applicants have already been verified and registered by UNHCR prior to submissions.  
For some countries, IOM compiles comprehensive individual profiles of resettling 
refugees to facilitate the eventual integration process.66  Also, States may decide to reject 
or at least delay arrivals of resettling refugees during pre-arrival selection procedures, 
according to their annual targets or ceilings, or depending upon whether the needs of 
resettling refugees can be met by the capacities of local receiving communities.  
Resettlement procedures are meticulously planned and controlled, step by step, from 
dossier submissions, interviews (often in-person), health screening, pre-departure 
orientation, departure and entry procedures, and reception arrangements to integration 
assistance.67  Even for emergency cases, governments are informed of arrivals at least a 
few days in advance.  RSD has already been conducted at least partly by UNHCR prior 
to submissions, allowing resettlement governments to conduct only a nominal RSD 
procedure, if any, as recommended in the EC proposal for the Union Resettlement 
Framework.  When it comes to cost, the per capita cost for resettling vulnerable or medical 
cases may well be higher than that required to integrate healthy, young asylum-seekers.  
However, resettlement of even such ‘expensive cases’ is implemented in accordance with 
budgetary and operational plans formulated well in advance, allowing government 
bureaucrats to justify its fiscal expenditures to their legislative bodies.  Although political 
‘cost’ is not completely eradicated in case of resettlement either, resettlement is possibly 
less politically sensitive than asylum, in that the accepting governments could use the 
rhetoric of burden-sharing ‘for the sake of’ the first countries of asylum and claim that 
the RSD was pre-conducted by UNHCR.68   
 To sum up, resettlement is an orderly, managed, controlled, and possibly cheaper 
migration scheme for States. 69   Particularly given the increasing security concerns 
stemming from the images of ‘uncontrolled arrivals of large numbers of asylum-seekers’, 
States appear increasingly to perceive resettlement as a more reasonable alternative to 
asylum.  Another incentive may be that resettlement saves States from conducting 
individual RSD procedures upon arrival which can be costly in financial, political, and 
diplomatic terms.  Resettlement is thus a ‘rational’ alternative for States, at least in 
comparison to asylum. 
 
8. RESETTLEMENT AS A ‘RATIONAL’ CHOICE FOR SOVEREIGN 
STATES 
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The hypothesis that States prefer resettlement as a rational alternative to asylum can find 
a theoretical framework within the Rational Choice Theory.70  According to this theory, 
individuals anticipate the outcomes of alternative courses of action and choose the 
alternative that is likely to give them the greatest satisfaction based upon calculation.71  
In the context of IR, the argument would be that States choose whatever strategy or course 
of action makes the better outcomes most likely, or maximises their utility or benefits.72  
For the Rational Choice theorists, it is individual self-interest and utilitarian calculation 
that govern the choice of the course of action, not altruism, reciprocity, social norms, or 
reputation.  In this sense, its starting point substantially overlaps with what traditional 
Realists have argued.  However, the most important difference between the Realist and 
Rational Choice arguments in terms of the central question of this paper is that not all 
resettlement States are necessarily concerned with the ‘utility’ of resettled refugees as a 
labour force or with expected diplomatic outcomes or security in the region of origin.  In 
light of the recent developments summarised above, States appear to be more concerned 
with the procedures and methods with which refugees are admitted than with the ultimate 
consequences.  The core State interest – or ‘preference’ as the Rational Choice theorists 
would put it – is in the complete control as to which refugees to resettle based upon pre-
screening conducted before they arrive.  Furthermore, the current trend cannot be 
perceived as simply being driven by egoism, given the increasing emphasis on 
vulnerability criteria, as demonstrated by the EU–Turkey deal, the U.K.’s ‘Syrian 
Vulnerable Person Resettlement Programme’, and the EC proposal to even expand the 
vulnerability criteria.  
 According to the Rational Choice Theorists, States’ identities, interests, and 
preferences are fixed and pre-determined.  Obviously, 33 resettlement countries have 
hugely divergent self-images and interests, which should be explored in separate 
empirical studies of 33 individual countries.  Notwithstanding, there are two fundamental 
features that are common for all the resettlement countries.  One is that they are all 
sovereign States with the imperative to secure border control and ensure orderly and 
managed arrival of foreign nationals.  The fact that “resettlement does not challenge State 
sovereignty” can function as a powerful incentive for States.73  The other feature is that 
they are all States Parties to the Refugee Convention, and this indicates two things: one 
is that these 33 States are committed to the idea of refugee protection at least officially 
and legally; and the other is that they have received fluctuating numbers of asylum 
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applications over the past several decades. 74   In addition, some newly emerging 
resettlement countries (such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and 
Switzerland) typically launched their official resettlement programmes only after 
conducting pilot cases or engaging with resettlement on an ad hoc basis.  Thus, those 
States can empirically compare pros and cons of the asylum process and the resettlement 
process as alternatives, as outlined above.  When sovereign States have a fixed interest in 
border control on the one hand and a commitment to refugee protection on the other, the 
rational solution to the equilibrium appears to be resettlement.      
 This perspective of rationality does not automatically negate the partial 
applicability of the four traditional perspectives.  As shown in Figure 1, egoistic self-
interest, altruistic humanitarianism, reciprocity, and international reputation function as a 
necessary condition for the States to become interested in resettlement to varying degrees 
depending upon their respective national interests and priorities.   However, one common 
sufficient condition that makes States actually implement resettlement seems to be the 
complete control that States can enjoy over resettlement procedures.  As Wohlforth puts 
it, the rationality assumption is shared by almost all theories of international politics and 
thus this alternative hypothesis can co-exist with other traditional perspectives.75  In other 
words, what possibly penetrates as a common denominator for all resettlement countries’ 
reasons for resettlement is the logic of border control and migration management, in 
addition to other various motives and incentives.   
At the same time, it is important to emphasise that the resettlement route has never 
been able to ‘replace’ the asylum route completely.  As van Selm underlines, ‘[n]o 
country that carries out resettlement in significant numbers has seen spontaneous arrivals 
of asylum-seekers disappear or dwindle as a result of resettlement’.76   Efforts to provide 
refugees with an orderly, safer and managed protection route should not mean, and have 
not actually resulted in, decreasing numbers of spontaneous arrivals of asylum-seekers.77  
A quick glance at any recent asylum and resettlement statistics will demonstrate that there 
is no empirical evidence for inverse proportion between the numbers of asylum applicants 
and refugees resettled in any country.  Even in an unlikely event where resettlement 
opportunities should be provided for all refugees identified by UNHCR as being in need 
of resettlement, there will always be individuals who would spontaneously arrive and 
seek asylum upon arrival.  In other words, increase in resettlement has no “deterrent effect” 
on asylum-seekers arriving spontaneously and irregularly.78  Resettlement cannot ‘deter’ 
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or ‘replace’ asylum, and this article does use the term ‘alternative’ in the sense of 
‘replacement’.  
 In conclusion, to answer the specific question of why an increasing number and 
variety of States have recently chosen to engage in resettlement proactively, the 
hypothesis of resettlement as a rational alternative to asylum for sovereign States wishing 
to manage migration provides a different perspective which seems to demonstrate 
potential applicability as a common denominator to all resettlement States. 
  
9. CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to tackle the question of why States admit refugees through 
resettlement within the framework of IR theories.  After demonstrating the limited 
explanatory power of the traditional theories vis-à-vis the contemporary resettlement 
spectrum, the paper proposed a different hypothesis – resettlement as a rational 
alternative to asylum for sovereign States wishing to manage migration – based upon 
recent empirical trends and examples.  The complete control that States can exert over 
the resettlement procedures and the possibility of avoiding individual asylum 
adjudication procedures upon arrival are the common feature that the resettlement route 
can offer all sovereign States.   
This conclusion by no means denies the applicability of the existing theories.  
Each of the four traditional perspectives applies to the motives of some resettlement 
countries to varying degrees.  Meanwhile, too little attention has been paid until now to 
the procedural advantage of resettlement which can function as the common denominator 
for all States’ incentives.  The fact that resettlement allows accepting States to control 
the entire procedures and choose whom to accept prior to arrival is appealing to 
sovereign States eager to control their borders and reduce irregular migrants.  
The paper does not claim that this alternative hypothesis has already been 
adequately demonstrated.  The notion of resettlement as an alternative to asylum is still 
at its hypothetical stage and needs to be tested further against a number of in-depth 
empirical studies, preferably for all of the 33 resettlement countries.  To this end, the 
author has been conducting field-based longitudinal studies on an emerging resettlement 
country, i.e. Japan, tracing the process in which an international notion of resettlement 
has come to be embraced by national decision-makers.  The argument in this paper 
simply adds another hypothesis to be tested in other empirical process-tracing research 
to identify a causal mechanism resulting in resettlement decisions made by States, 
particularly non-immigration countries. 
The paper has intentionally eschewed making any value judgment on the 
emerging policy preference.  Normative evaluation on the trend of resettlement being 
used – or even abused – as an alternative to asylum is a totally separate question from the 
theoretical analyses that this paper has engaged with.  Rationality does not automatically 
connote ‘good’ or ‘legitimate’ or ‘justifiable’.  It goes without saying that resettlement 
should remain a complement to, and not a substitute for, the right to seek asylum, as 
   
already emphasised by many scholars.79 The emerging trend of trading between asylum-
seekers and refugees to be resettled has clearly run the egregious risk of eroding the 
institution of asylum.  Separate research is needed to analyse critically negative as well 
as potentially positive aspects of the emerging trend in terms of both principles and 
pragmatism.80  For instance, to what extent has the shift from asylum to resettlement 
deprived spontaneously arriving asylum-seekers of the right to seek asylum and increased 
de facto deportation?    To what extent have increased security concerns shifted the focus 
of selection criteria from integration prospects to vulnerability, thereby making 
resettlement opportunities available for more vulnerable refugees?  If the in-country 
asylum application procedures are expanded and institutionalised, as proposed in the EC 
proposal, could it truly facilitate overcoming one of the critical flaws of the current 
international refugee protection regime, in that asylum is fundamentally premised upon 
individuals’ ability to flee the country of origin?81  Clearly, more research is needed.    
Lastly, while the paper has mainly engaged with deductive theory applications 
and the proposal of a new hypothesis, such a theoretical dialogue has practical 
implications, as well.  By focusing on how States perceive two distinct refugee protection 
tools, the paper has attempted to shed light on the logics behind the preference placed by 
sovereign States on resettlement over asylum, i.e. migration management and pre-arrival 
screening.  International and national actors who have been struggling to improve global 
resettlement practice significantly either in quantity or in quality should take full 
advantage of the leverage power of State motives such as these.  
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